Operation Niagara

Khe Sanh had top-priority claim on all U.S. air assets in Southeast Asia. B-52s, personally directed by General Westmoreland from the Saigon MACV combat operations center, came from Guam, Thailand, and Okinawa. The Marines and U.S. Air Force provided fighter-bomber support from bases within South Vietnam. Naval aviators from Task Force 77 flew sorties from aircraft carriers in the South China Sea. The South Vietnamese Air Force and U.S. Army aviation also provided aerial support. From B-52s, originally designed as high-altitude strategic bombers for the delivery of nuclear weapons, to propeller-driven A-1 Skyraiders, the entire spectrum of American fixed-wing and rotary aircraft were deployed to support the 26th Marine Regiment at Khe Sanh.

Air representatives worked with their artillery counterparts in the Fire Support Coordination Center. Requests for air support were channeled through the Tactical Air Direction Center of the 1st Marine Air Wing (1st MAW) at Da Nang. If the 1st MAW could not fill a quota, liaison teams from other services were called upon for their support. The priority for air support was so high that at times the sky over Khe Sanh resembled "a giant beehive." 10 Upon arrival, aircraft were normally directed into a holding pattern until a ground controller or ground radar operator was free to direct the strike. Often these patterns extended upward to 35,000 feet with dozens of aircraft gradually corkscrewing their way downward as each flight delivered its ordnance and departed Khe Sanh airspace. A pilot might be directed to a succession of holding points only to end up with his fuel expended and his full load of ordnance still on board. If the pilot ran out of fuel before his turn came to deliver a strike, he was forced to jettison his bombs and return to base.

The contribution of U.S. Navy aviation reflected events in North Vietnam. Clouds that enveloped North Vietnam airspace forced a reduction in the number of Navy sorties there and the released planes and munitions were re-directed against targets around Khe Sanh. In February, about seventy-seven percent of Navy carrier sorties planned against North Vietnam were altered in this manner. One naval aviator who attacked the NVA trench system described the detonation of his 1,000-pound delayed action bomb as resembling the eruption of volcanoes. After collapsing fifty meters of trench, the NVA abandoned the building of assault positions in this area.

Close air support was employed against pinpoint targets in proximity of friendly troops. Usually there were fighter-bombers overhead at Khe Sanh around the clock. Tactical air controllers in light airplanes or helicopters maintained communications between strike pilots and troops on the ground. The tactical controller made a marking run by firing a smoke rocket or throwing a colored smoke grenade at the target to be attacked. When the strike pilot saw the smoke, dummy passes were made until the controller was satisfied the jets were lined up on the proper target. Bombing runs were executed and short corrections were made via radio until all ordnance was expended. The tactical air controller would then fly over the target to record the effectiveness of the strike. Battle Damage Assessments were relayed to the departing aircraft for intelligence debriefings upon return to base.

Ground-controlled radar bombing was employed in periods when the target could not be acquired due to bad weather. Radar controllers operated from a heavily reinforced bunker which contained fragile computer equipment and the TPQ-10 radar used to guide aircraft to their target. This radar emitted a beam which locked onto the aircraft. Using targeting data acquired from the FSCC, the controller programmed the computer with information on enemy position, ballistic characteristics of the ordnance, wind speed and direction, and other relevant data. At a predetermined release point, the controller instructed the pilot when to release his bombs. In specially-equipped aircraft such as the twin-engine Marine A-6 Intruder, the bombs could be released automatically by the ground controller. Marine controllers routinely directed strikes as close as 500 meters from friendly positions. The Air Force liaison officer felt strikes could be conducted to within fifty meters in case of emergency. 12 Marine air flew 7,078 sorties and delivered 17,015 tons of ordnance in defense of Khe Sanh, while the U.S. Air Force tactical aircraft contributed 9,691 sorties and 14,223 tons of munitions.

The most spectacular display of aerial power at Khe Sanh was provided by the B-52 Stratofortresses. With a payload of 108 500-pound bombs per plane, these Arc Light strikes were conducted against area targets such as troop concentrations, supply areas, and bunker complexes. These targets were programmed into on-board computers and were launched from altitudes above 30,000 feet. Arc Light bombing procedures were based on a grid system, with each block in the NIAGARA area represented by a one by two kilometer box superimposed on a map. Three B-52s, composing one cell, could effectively blanket such a box with high explosives.

On average, every ninety minutes one three-plane cell of B-52s would arrive on location around Khe Sanh and be directed to a particular target by a controller. Several flights of B-52s could churn up boxes of terrain several thousand meters long. Many enemy casualties were sustained from concussion alone. In some instances, NVA soldiers were found after an Arc Light strike wandering around in a daze with blood streaming from their noses and mouths. To catch these stunned survivors above ground, artillerymen at Khe Sanh often placed massed artillery fire into the Arc Light target area ten to fifteen minutes after the departure of the heavy bombers.

Arc Light attacks delivered a total of 59,542 tons of munitions from 2,548 sorties during the siege. 14 General Westmoreland was elated at the performance of B-52s, going so far as to maintain that the battle of Khe Sanh was won by the officers and men of the 3d Air Division (B-52). According to Westmoreland, the thing that broke the backs of the NVA at Khe Sanh was "basically the fire of the B-52's."

This high praise notwithstanding, Arc Light attacks had some limitations. A North Vietnamese soldier captured in April 1968, told his interrogators that his unit received frequent, timely, and accurate warnings of impending B-52 attacks. These alerts came either by radio or telephone and usually provided two hours' notice, sufficient for the NVA to depart the planned strike area. The NVA prisoner was not certain as to the origin of these warnings. Possibilities include Soviet intelligence-gathering trawlers operating in the Pacific and the interception of communications sent to or from the MACV combat operations center at Tan Son Nhut air base near Saigon.

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