Siege of Khe Sanh

Air operations on the logistical side also progressed. Following the termination of G- 130 aircraft landings, the Air Force introduced a new procedure to continue supplying the main Khe Sanh base. Known as the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System or LAPES, this self-contained method of delivery had been put to good use while the air strip was being repaired in late 1967. The name of the system accurately described the technique. As the aircraft came in low over the airstrip, the pilot opened the tail gate and released a reefed cargo parachute which was connected to the pallet mounted cargo in the aircraft. When the pilot electrically cut the reefing line, it caused the parachute to fully deploy and inflate. The parachute then jerked the pallets out of the aircraft over the roller system mounted on the aircraft floor. After a five- to ten-foot drop, the cargo skidded to a halt on the runway. Experienced pilots could consistently leave their loads in a 25-meter square.

A second technique was also used to deliver cargo by aircraft without actually landing. This method, known as the Ground Proximity Extraction System or GPES, was used less frequently than the low altitude system. In the GPES delivery, as the C-130 aircraft came in low over the airstrip, the pilot would try to snag an arresting line on the ground similar to the line a navy pilot uses in landing on an aircraft carrier. The ground line then jerked the cargo from the opened rear of the aircraft.

About 65 deliveries using the low altitude and ground proximity systems were made before Khe Sanh was relieved and resupply effected by way of Route 9. By far, the majority of the supplies for the base were delivered by parachute because weather was too poor to permit the visual flying required for the two extraction type systems.

Another aspect of the air operations was the last leg of the resupply system in which helicopters picked up supplies at Dong Ha and carried them to the outposts on the surrounding hills. They faced the same problems as did the fixed-wing pilots, but to a greater degree. The low-flying helicopter pilots were more vulnerable than their higher flying, faster fellow aviators. Because of the additional exposure, helicopters soon were escorted by strike aircraft to provide suppressive fire as they dropped off supplies and picked up troops.

Helicopters were greatly affected by the weather. When the helicopters were grounded, life became hard on the marines in the outposts. One period of weather when the helicopters could not fly persisted for nine days and created such a water shortage that one small position was authorized to conduct a two-hour march to obtain water from the nearest stream. The patrol surprised a group of North Vietnamese soldiers and eliminated many of them.

Fighting on the ground in Operation SCOTLAND, a Marine designation, continued through the end of February. The last day of the month, 29 February, General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds pieced together the relevant facts to reason that a big North Vietnamese push was imminent. Each day brought better weather and longer flying hours. Numerous intelligence reports pointed to a massing of North Vietnamese units at three points around the main base. Although the North Vietnamese had failed to gain control of the hill outposts, he could not afford to let the weather improve much more before he acted.

During the early evening hours of 29 February, a string of sensors indicated a major movement of troops along Route 9. The fire support control center at the base directed all available assets against the area. The firepower was massive. Artillery, radar-guided fighter bombers, and minor and major B-52 strikes pounded the North Vietnamese's route of march.

A battalion of the 304th North Vietnamese Army Division made the first strike at 2130 on 29 February. The 37th Vietnamese Army Ranger Battalion received the brunt of the initial assault, and all available supporting fire was given the rangers. Hit with this concentrated firepower, the North Vietnamese was unable to breach the outer defenses. His second attempt two hours later met a similar fate. So did the third at 0315 on 1 March. The supporting fires had prevented the assault waves from gaining momentum.

Although the North Vietnamese continued to harass the base, to probe the weakness along the perimeter, and to shell it from a distance, they had changed their basic tactics. They assumed a less aggressive posture and began waiting for the Marine patrols to come to them. But this did not help them either. As time passed and the weather improved, indications by mid-March were that major North Vietnamese Army units were leaving the area around Khe Sanh.

The Marine's last significant clash during Operation Scotland took place on 30 March when a company, moving under a closely co-ordinated artillery support package, swept 850 meters south of the Khe Sanh perimeter and assaulted a heavily fortified North Vietnamese position. Surprise was with the attackers, however, and the marines drove the North Vietnamese out of his positions, destroyed the fortifications, and returned to their base.

The contents of this web site are Copyright © 2009 Philadelphia Website Design. All Rights Reserved.

Please review our Privacy Policy.

Vietnam War is the best Vietnam War information resource on the Internet. We offer information on Vietnam War History, Vietnam War Timeline, Vietnam War Facts, Vietnam War Myths, Vietnam War Figures, Vietnam War Battles, Vietnam War Weapons, Vietnam War Aircraft, Vietnam War Protests, Vietnam War Prisoners, Vietnam War Casualties, Vietnam War Quotes, Vietnam War Memorial, Vietnam War Veterans and more.

Help us make this site better - and have fun! Take our quick survey. Click here!